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Abstract
The threat to national security from terrorists acting on their own initiative is a challenge for law enforcement and
intelligence agencies in the UK and elsewhere. The UK Parliament’s 2014 threat assessment noted ‘a trend towards ‘low
signature’ terrorism by small, self-directed groups and lone actors’ [House of Commons Home Affairs Committee (2014)
Counter-Terrorism – Seventeenth Report of Session 2013–14]. Lone actors have become a higher priority for counter-
terrorism professionals (UK police, Prevent practitioners and security agencies), but there is a paucity of research into
the views and awareness of these professionals. This qualitative study examined how Prevent practitioners perceived the
radicalisation and motivations of lone-actor terrorists they had encountered. Participants were an opportunity sample of
five Prevent practitioners; all had served as police officers with varying employment backgrounds and counter-terrorism
experience. A thematic analysis of semi-structured interviews identified perceived general characteristics of lone-actor
radicalisation. Three themes clustering around the concept of becoming a terrorist are discussed: mechanisms of
radicalisation, vulnerability to radical discourse, and individual motivation. Participants construed radicalisation as a
process over time, accelerated in the presence of generalised criminality or extensive Internet use. Vulnerability was
seen as inherent, as well as a product of social context. Participants adopted folk-psychological explanations with mental
health problems, social isolation and relative deprivation cited as prominent vulnerability factors. Lone actors were seen
as motivated by grievances (e.g. deprivation), pressure from external sources (e.g. rational prospectors) or personal
reward (e.g. sensation-seeking). Practitioners’ perceptions of the process over time had parallels with a diathesis–stress
model, although there was some support for social movement theory.
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rest of the world. The House of Commons’ counter-
terrorism report noted ‘a trend towards ‘‘low signature’’
terrorism by small, self-directed groups and lone actors’
(House of Commons Affairs Committee, 2014: 6). The
report also highlighted police concerns over self-
radicalising individuals motivated to commit indepen-
dent attacks (House of Commons Affairs Committee,
2014). Examples include Pavlo Lapshyn who stabbed
an elderly Muslim man and detonated explosives outside
three UK mosques in 2013 (Dodd, 2010, 2013; Lumb
and Casciani, 2013) and lone actor Anders Breivik who
killed 77 people in Norway (Bakker and de Graaf, 2010,
2011).
The extant literature revolves around particular topics.
Radicalisation studies generally focus on individuals’ cog-
nition and the ways in which ideas culminate in violent
action (Borum, 2011a, 2011b). It has also been established
that lone actors are notoriously difficult to detect using the
existing repertoire of investigative techniques (Bryniels-
son et al., 2012). More generally, in counter-terrorism
research, there is a paucity of empirical studies. A 2008
systematic review found thought pieces predominant, with
empirical work comprising as little as 3% of the literature
(Lum, Kennedy and Sherley, 2008). Sageman (2014: 565)
wrote of the stagnation in counter-terrorism research due
to ‘an unbridgeable gap between academia and the intel-
ligence community’. Sageman concluded that this aca-
demic–practitioner gap was responsible for the current
failure to understand what leads someone to political vio-
lence. The lack of empirical studies from poor or no
access to data may also explain the tendency to produce
unrelated disparate academic models. Ackerman and Pin-
son (2014), noting the absence of data on lone actors,
compiled their own chemical, biological, radiological or
nuclear (CBRN) database of recorded incidents involving
474 perpetrators, but acknowledged significant gaps; some
identities were unknown, other attributions (e.g. political
cause, target) had to be categorised as ‘probable’ or ‘pos-
sible’. Post attack, case studies do appear with public
access documents used as data. Gartenstein-Ross (2013)
used multiple data sources, interviewing criminal justice
professionals and analysing public court documents to
produce a case study on lone actor Abdulhakim Mujahid
Muhammed (ne´e Carlos Bledsoe). McCauley and Moska-
lenko (2014) also used publicly available data, collating
opinion pools of UK and US Muslims to infer radicalised
opinions (also see Kedar and Yerushalmi, 2011; Jasparro,
2011; and Jordan and Man˜as, 2007). McCauley and Mos-
kalenko (2014) also explored radical action via case his-
tories of radicalised lone actors (also see e.g. Jensen, 2014,
for historical case studies). Lone actor Anders Breivik’s
online postings and high media profile provided data for
several studies. Pantucci (2011a, 2011b) acknowledged
the debt to Breivik’s own online biography as a data
source, as did Johnsen (2014) who used it for content
analysis (also see Bakker and de Graaf, 2011, on Breivik
and other lone wolf case histories). Although rich in detail,
idiographic approaches (for want of larger data samples)
leave a research gap. As Sageman argued, access to data
constitutes the more central challenge. Hewitt (2014) also
drew on public records to examine lone wolf (n ¼ 10) and
other attacks (n ¼ 10). The law enforcement agencies’
investigation was an organising rationale for Hewitt’s
cases; however, being confined to publicly available data
created a necessarily partial view. Sageman’s (2014) view
appears to be confirmed in that empirical work, where it
appears at all, tends to rely on views from the outside
rather than data from the inside. This lack of access to
intelligence agencies’ data may be unsurprising, but is
nevertheless unsatisfactory for understanding the topic.
Securing access to counter-terrorism professionals seems
unfortunately rare, yet is necessary to establish an inside
view of practice.
A further obvious inference from the dearth of empirical
work is that counter-terrorism praxis may not be evidence
based. However, it is difficult to be sure because compara-
tively little is known about practitioners. Researching prac-
titioner perceptions of lone-actor terrorists therefore
constitutes a valuable and rare addition to the literature.
In short, the focus of the this article is less on establishing
lone terrorists’ internal motivations or cognitive factors and
more on describing Prevent practitioners’ perceptions of
their encounters with lone actors.
This study faced the same challenges Sageman identi-
fied in that it comprised a very small sample, which was,
therefore, likely to be viewed as problematic in some
respects. For example, generalisation would be regarded
as difficult as would seeking to validate academic theore-
tical models from such an underpowered sample. However,
an opportunity to explore the perceptions of a rarely
accessed professional group should not be lost. Asking
‘To what extent does practice reflect what is known?’
might not yield answers of sufficient power from which
to generalise, but it was anticipated that an exploratory
analysis of some counter-terrorism practitioners’ percep-
tions would provide some interesting future directions on
issues that could be fruitfully explored in greater depth. In
short, an empirical study (with limitations acknowledged)
was preferable to a further speculative ‘thought piece’.
Hence, we aimed to seize the opportunity for access and
understand some practitioners’ views. It is relevant to dis-
cuss officers’ understanding of lone actors in light of the
research evidence base. To that end, an overview is pre-
sented next.
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Terminology and definitions
‘Prevent’ is the first of four key strands in the United
Kingdom’s (UK) strategic counter-terrorism document,
CONTEST. Prevent is specifically concerned with prevent-
ing individuals becoming terrorists or being drawn into
supporting terrorism. Prevent is a multiagency responsibil-
ity (e.g. criminal justice, education) and the document sets
out guidance, structures or arrangements for relevant agen-
cies to inform programme development and delivery
(Home Office, 2011).
Given that participants were UK Prevent practitioners,
‘radicalisation’ was defined in accordance with their
policy-prescribed working definition from the UK Prevent
strategy: ‘The process by which a person comes to support
terrorism and forms of extremism leading to terrorism’
(Home Office, 2011: 108). Similarly, the term ‘lone actor’
was adopted because it is used by MI5 and therefore perti-
nent to the UK counter-terrorism context. The term has
been criticised as a multifarious construct (Nesser, 2012),
but the literature shows reasonable consensus for the term
when recognised affiliation was absent; in addition, lone
actors also encompassed other definitions’ referents (see
e.g. Pantucci, 2011a, 2011b, on loners and lone wolves).
MI5 is part of the UK’s security services responsible for
protecting the UK’s national security. Countering terror-
ism, espionage and latterly cyber threats all fall within the
security services’ remit. MI5 is responsible for domestic
security, whereas its counterpart MI6 undertakes the same
duties in relation to foreign threats. They do so via gather-
ing, analysing and otherwise managing information and
intelligence. Responsibilities also include advising the gov-
ernment or other agencies on how to combat security
threats (MI5, 2015). The MI5 definition ‘Groups or indi-
viduals [that] motivate themselves, develop the capability
to carry out attacks and select targets completely indepen-
dently of established terrorist groups’ (MI5, 2014) was duly
adopted and bounded the scope of the research.
It was not known what personal beliefs or values the
participants held; indeed, the Prevent practitioners had vary-
ing backgrounds, but their occupational role nonetheless
bounded, and thus homogenised, the group on the relevant
dimensions. Policy and procedures are powerful communi-
cators of the organisational status quo (Andras and Charlton,
2005). These and other organisational products also main-
tain organisational identity (Eyre and Alison, 2007; Eyre,
Alison, Crego and McLean, 2008). Specifically, the practi-
tioners’ occupational role ties them to the Prevent strategy
and accompanying programmes (e.g. Channel, see below)
and situates their organisational identity, locating them as
individuals within a specific organisational culture. Organi-
sational norms would be mediated through a practitioner’s
individual organisational identity and likely experienced as
pressure to conform to the policy or procedural status quo.
Homogenising the group via organisational identity (Tajfel
and Turner, 1986) may well enhance representativeness.
This cannot be measured in this small study, merely averred;
however, given they were drawn from a specialised popula-
tion, it is likely that this small sample was more representa-
tive of its relevant population than general samples (Eyre,
2014). It is nonetheless acknowledged as speculative.
Although these processes were not the main object of con-
cern in this study, social (aka organisational) identity theory
(Tajfel and Turner, 1986) and self-categorisation theory
(Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher and Wetherell, 1987) have
explanatory power for the plausible mechanisms of practi-
tioners conforming to or rejecting particular ideas or beliefs
about lone wolves. Albeit beyond the scope of this article, it
may prove a useful avenue for others to explore.
Scoping the problem
The discourses around violent extremism are replete with
ill-defined concepts (see, e.g. Richards, 2011, on senior
police confiding that they do not know what the Prevent
strategy actually means, or Schmid, 2004, on various fra-
meworks for conceptualising terrorism). Lone wolves are
likewise a nebulous phenomenon. In highlighting the dan-
ger of Internet access for lone actors, some characterise
lone wolves as misanthropes too socially inept to function
as part of operational networks of terrorists (Ackerman and
Pinson, 2014). The idiosyncratic nature of such actors
reduces the possibility of identifying (and thereby effec-
tively countering) their attacks. Lone wolves may, then,
be disproportionately feared beyond the threat they actually
present. In short, prediction demands a pattern, but there
cannot be a pattern in a sample of one. Hence, this unpre-
dictability means there is something of the bogeyman about
a lone wolf that propels fear (Burton and Scott, 2008). In
turn, worst case scenarios tend to appear with CBRN
attacks cited despite the difficulties a lone actor would face
in obtaining such weapons. Ackerman and Pinson (2014)
acknowledged the difficulties lone wolves faced in obtain-
ing CBRN weapons; where cases did exist, chemical agents
were the most likely to be used, although biological weap-
ons led to the greatest disruption (e.g. anthrax in the post).
Cases were generally too few to distinguish reliably from
individuals with formal terrorist affiliations, although lone
actors’ motives were found to be criminal or idiosyncratic,
with the latter being associated with mental illness.
Identifying the scale of the challenge, Spaaij (2012)
reported 198 lone-actor attacks in Europe, Australia and
North America between 1968 and 2010. Within a context
of 9591 total incidents recorded on the Homeland Security
database (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism
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and Responses to Terrorism, n.d.), lone-actor attacks form a
small proportion and, thus, are understandably seen as
black swan events (Bakker and de Graaf, 2010). Research
into the lone-actor phenomenon is, therefore, faced with the
challenge of a comparatively small number of cases
although the body of literature has grown as the number
of lone-actor attacks has increased (Bakker and de Graaf,
2011). A range of topics have been covered. Theoretical
frameworks explicate contextual influences. However,
much of the literature focuses on ‘looking inside’ the indi-
vidual, for example, the rationality of individuals’ decision
making, with studies of cost–benefit analyses (McCauley
and Moskalenko, 2008), mental health difficulties (Spaaij,
2010, 2012) or isolation (Gruenewald, Chermak and Frei-
lich, 2013) cited as contributory factors. It is difficult to
move the research forward beyond speculation and fear-
driven worst-case scenarios without access to reliable data.
Indeed, Sageman (2014: 565) argued that terrorism
research had stagnated, attributing this to ‘an unbridgeable
gap between academia and the intelligence community’
denying researchers access to data and thus preventing
empirical research.
Pathways to violence
Within the extant literature on radicalisation and other
politically motivated violence, there is academic consensus
on a complex and dynamic interplay of circumstances and
mechanisms, and support for the notion of each individu-
al’s unique combination of contributory factors and psy-
chological processes (Cohen, 2012). No single explanation
is applicable to all instances (Borum, 2011a); some features
and mechanisms are nonetheless recurrent, generating a
number of phased-pathway models (Spaaij, 2012). Path-
ways typically propose adoption of extremist beliefs and
progression to violent acts (Cohen, 2012) with stages in
between that offer either disengagement opportunities or
alternative radical expression (Spaaij, 2012).
Theoretical frameworks
Social movement theory and conversion theory are promi-
nent theoretical frameworks. Social movements are
acknowledged as dynamic and complex entities (Bayat,
2005), and social movement theory seeks to explain the
processes entailed in social mobilisation (Marsden, 2014).
The theory provides insight into the processes underpin-
ning social movements, where movement refers to coop-
erating individuals who act collectively to effect social
change such that cultural or political environments may
be transformed (Bayat, 2005). It is predicated on the ideas
of political opportunity to engage with or oppose elites and
mobilise resources to attain specifically framed goals
(Marsden, 2014). Fuist (2013) argued that culture was an
important influence on social movement. Specifically, he
cited the role of culture as a resource, as an influence on
particular sites as seats of social movement and, more gen-
erally, as a contextual framework for activity (also see
Gahan and Pekarek, 2013, on social movement theory as
framework for the development of collective identities).
The theory accommodates explanations of particular forces
as being pivotal to social movements; for example, Tug˘al
(2009) introduced a hegemonic account to account for Isla-
mist social mobilisation.
Social movement theory extends beyond individual cog-
nition to consider the role of recruiters in the decision to
embrace a movement or radical ideology, describing them
as rational prospectors (Brady, Schlozman and Verba,
1999). Rational prospectors aim to stimulate the move-
ment’s growth by identifying vulnerable individuals and
securing their participation (Borum, 2011a). The approach
explicates group processes so might not initially appear
applicable to lone actors, but online resources may function
as a social influence in the absence of recognised terrorist
affiliations (Brady et al., 1999). Thus, social movement
models can incorporate lone-actor terrorists. Wiktoro-
wicz’s (2005) well-established model is perhaps the best
known in social movement theory, positing a four-
component radicalisation process: cognitive opening, reli-
gious seeking, frame alignment, and reinforcement from
external commentators (Borum, 2011a, 2011b).
Compared with social movement theory, conversion
theory has less emphasis on groups or movements and more
on understanding how individuals change existing beliefs
to conform to a new ideology. Nevertheless, there are some
parallels with the stages in social movement theory models.
Rambo’s (1993) seven-stage conversion model (conver-
sion, crisis, quest, encounter, interaction, commitment and
consequences) explained the cumulative stages in the pro-
gression of religious change. The model is equally capable
of explaining how individuals are able to change their
belief system (Borum, 2011a, 2011b). Conversion theory’s
reliability and validity are considered reasonable given
repeated study over the last half-century (Borum, 2011a,
2011b).
Drivers and motivations
For the most part, radicalisation theories develop the con-
cept that the principal motivation driving radicalisation is
discontent or deprivation relative to other populations
(Spaaij, 2012). Such personal grievances propel lone actors
to seek redress; they incorporate them into their own moti-
vational narrative alongside the more general sentiments of
a radical ideology. This amalgamation results in a personal
ideology, but common grievances do not necessarily mean
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a single profile (Spaaij, 2012). Lone actors may vary con-
siderably in their respective ideological affiliation, method
of attack and religious beliefs. Further, the reliability of the
common features suggested may be questionable due to a
lack of citable examples and an over-reliance on historical
data from high-profile cases (Bakker and de Graaf, 2011).
Personal circumstances are thought to drive grievances
that influence radicalisation (Bhui, Warfa and Jones, 2014).
The variety of circumstances is reflected in the literature: for
example, Nesser (2012) cited social isolation as a key vul-
nerability factor, whereas Brynielsson et al. (2012) argued
that reclusion applied to real-world existence, but did not
extend to online personae; Weimann (2012) regarded the
Internet as having a significant role in radicalisation (also
see Ranieri and Barrs, 2011; Raudler, 2014; Sivek, 2013);
Conway and McInerney (2008) tracked greater accessibility
of extremist content; and Dienel, Yair, Rapp and Ahituv
(2010) examined online content and its effect on radicalisa-
tion of potential terrorists. Given the focus on practitioner
perceptions, however, a detailed review of lone actors’
actual circumstances is beyond the scope of this study.
Mental health
More generally, radicalisation research has shifted focus
from the erstwhile assumption that violent extremism was
the preserve of the mentally unstable to an understanding of
radicalisation and violent extremism as a complex and
dynamic process (Borum, 2011a). The existing literature
typically develops the concept that the principal motivation
for radicalisation is discontent, political suppression or
deprivation relative to other populations (Spaaij, 2012).
This is alongside a widely supported view that mental ill-
ness is not one of the overriding characteristics of terrorists
(Bakker and de Graaf, 2011). However, that view was pre-
dicated on terrorists committing violent acts under the com-
mand and control of a terrorist organisation. By contrast,
lone-actor terrorism has been identified as being associated
with higher instances of psychological disturbance and
social isolation (Spaaij, 2010). Mental health issues were
also identified in the Channel Vulnerability Assessment
Framework as a psychological hook likely to influence an
individual’s engagement with an ideology (Her Majesty’s
Government, 2012). The Channel assessment framework
(or colloquially, ‘programme’) refers to a UK multiagency
initiative designed to identify individuals at risk of radica-
lisation and provide them with support. Multiagency panels
assess risk and decide how best to devise and deliver
bespoke support. Interventions aim to de-radicalise individ-
uals or safeguard against being drawn into acts of violence
(Home Office, 2011). Among other issues, such assess-
ments would consider this very important qualification:
lone actors’ mental health difficulties do not necessarily
affect their cognitive regulation. They may still possess the
mental capacity and organisation to plan and carry out an
attack (Spaiij, 2012).
In sum, the extant literature ignores the professionals in
favour of seeking to understand potential offenders. Several
pathways or factors in radicalisation are proposed including
higher rates of psychological abnormality in lone actors
and the use of Internet resources to access radical materials.
Method
The current research built on the work of Spaaij (2010) on
lone-actor radicalisation in the USA by providing a parallel
UK picture. The MI5 definition adopted here was concor-
dant with Spaiij’s non-affiliated, non-trained individuals,
some with mental health problems. Data comprised semi-
structured interviews with UK Prevent practitioners.1 The-
matic analysis (Braun and Clarke, 2006) was used to
examine the data. The theoretical and epistemological free-
dom of thematic analysis enabled analysis to stay close to
the data and explore implicit and explicit concepts (Guest,
McQueen and Namey, 2011). It was an ideal method for
capturing in-depth, practitioners’ perspectives.
As mentioned earlier, data came from a small sample. It
is beyond the scope of this study to discuss the merits of
small samples but, suffice to say, there is not a dichotomy
between statistically sufficiently powered samples and no
generalisation or even no insight at all. Empirical general-
isation does not require a statistical technique or a sample
size of sufficient power for statistics (Gomm, Hammersley
and Foster, 2000). Williams’ (2000) idea of moderatum
generalisation can be invoked. Moderate claims can be
made where there is some form of cultural consistency in
the social environment, such as a shared occupational cul-
ture (also see Eyre, 2014; Fairweather and Rinne, 2012).
This sample was homogenised on relevant dimensions,
sharing organisational culture, professional development
programmes, policy and procedures and so forth. These
features may not have been measured, but they clearly
existed, allowing some moderatum generalisations to be
made. It could be argued that they are not as valid or reli-
able as higher powered larger samples; they may, nonethe-
less, serve to provide ecologically valid insights which can
act as springboard for future in-depth research in a domain
sorely lacking in empirical work.
Participants
Interviews were conducted with an opportunity sample of
Prevent practitioners with varying employment back-
grounds and counter-terrorism experience. Given the sen-
sitivities of the work and the relatively small total
population, anonymity could be compromised, so participant
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detail is necessarily restricted here although all had previous
employment as police officers, homogenising the group in
terms of organisational culture, professional development
and so forth. The sample consisted of five participants respon-
sible for the delivery of a variety of Prevent products, includ-
ing delivery of the Channel programme. All participants were
male; ages ranged from 43 to 59 years (M¼ 53.8); experience
in counter-terrorism work ranged from 4 to 30 years
(M ¼ 12.8). Demographics are presented in Table 1.
Procedure
Participants were contacted via email with a description of
the study, ethics and consent information, researcher contact
details and a request for a semi-structured interview (max. 1
hour) with the researcher. Opt-in consent was obtained. A
Dictaphone was used to record the face-to-face interviews
that were later transcribed, coded and analysed to identify
common themes. Handling of interview data conformed
with all requirements of the Data Protection Act (Her
Majesty’s Government, 1998). Analysis comprised line-by-
line coding. In vivo or summary codes were used to facilitate
indexing of features. Categories were refined iteratively.
Emergent themes were then reviewed in comparison with
established lone-actor characteristics to assess relevance of
current literature to UK radicalisation prevention initiatives.
Findings are presented as direct quotations from transcript
extracts supporting discussion of extant literature.
Results and Analysis
Three themes on lone-actor radicalisation, clustering
around the concepts of vulnerability and motivation are
discussed, they are: mechanisms of radicalisation, factors
of vulnerability to radical discourse, and individual moti-
vation; they are detailed below.
Mechanisms of radicalisation
Participants did not exemplify a particular model of lone-actor
radicalisation. However, they did construe radicalisation as a
process over time and described differences: those already
predisposed to criminality were perceived as moving more
quickly to acts of violence; others seen to move quickly did
so via the assistance of Internet sources.
Some people do go over a long process . . . and then get more
and more frustrated and move towards direct action at the end.
I think the longer process is for people outside the criminal
arena, people with genuine grievances who’ve tried legal . . .
they’ve protested and they think, ‘Actually this is doing noth-
ing for me’, and then move on. . . . I think there are other peo-
ple who are already in the criminal arena and they can jump
straight into it. (P1)
Somebody can go from A to Z very quickly, they become
an unknown, sat in their bedroom, researching conspiracy the-
ories, watching YouTube videos, and then do something with-
out any precursor involvement with security services. (P5)
I think it’s very difficult to profile what the route to radi-
calisation is . . . it’s very difficult to map out, what the key
stepping stones [are] for somebody. (P5)
Radicalisation was perceived to be a social process,
whereby external voices influenced individuals by
encouraging and legitimising individual acts of terrorism.
The perceived role of external voices lends some support
for social movement theories. Importantly, it was seen to
occur beyond the sight of the security services. Partici-
pants’ views were reflected through a policing lens. For
example, general criminality was cited as a catalyst. Simi-
larly, being absent from the purview of the security services
was taken as evidence of rapid progression to violence.
Neither are necessary inferences to have taken. Further
research could examine the degree of support for earlier
literature; for example, whether grievances about relative
deprivation were specific motivation for terrorism (Spaiij,
2012) or whether deprivation was a driver of generalised
criminality later channelled towards terrorism. Alterna-
tively, this finding could simply be a reflection of interpret-
ing behaviour through a policing lens and subsuming
behaviours into a general criminal category.
Vulnerability to radical discourse
Vulnerability to radical discourse was a prominent theme.
Broadly, individuals were characterised as vulnerable
because of a personal characteristic that rendered them
unable to resist radical discourse, or the influence of the
social context in which they lived, or both. All participants
viewed mental health issues as a significant factor in per-
sonal vulnerability.
Certainly in our Channel cases, I would say it’s really common
. . . most of our Channel referrals have a mental health
Table 1. Participant demographics.
Participant
number
Age
(years) Sex
Current
employment
(years)
Counter-terrorism
experience (years)
1 43 Male 6 6
2 53 Male 2 15
3 59 Male 1 4
4 56 Male 2 9
5 58 Male 5 30
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element. These are the people that are getting drawn into grie-
vances and I think it’s around that sort of compulsiveness
within some mental health disorders. (P1)
No doubt whatsoever that people with mental health issues
are far, far more vulnerable and susceptible to this messa-
ging. (P2)
Most terrorist organisations won’t touch them [individuals
with mental health problems] because they’re too risky. That
doesn’t stop them being lone actors. (P1)
Common features seem to be low-level mental health issues
where people become isolated, low self-esteem . . . can drive
some of their behaviour. (P5)
Reference was made to specific cases and the perceived
contribution of mental health problems to vulnerability to
radicalisation. It was not clear what participants’ views
were predicated upon: for example, whether participants
possessed any expertise in mental health or whether they
drew on other professionals’ formulations (e.g. psychia-
trists or psychologists). However, the views do support the
literature on higher numbers of lone actors having mental
health problems (Spaaij, 2010, 2012). Comments had a
folk-psychological tone.
Deprived emotionally, psychologically, he wasn’t nurtured.
(P1)
Because of that mental health issue, they are actually in a
place where they can’t actually rationalise a lot of these things,
they can’t actually understand the implications of what they
are doing . . . what people are manipulating you to do . . . they
take things very much at face value. (P2)
He walks around in his community: nobody will acknowl-
edge him . . . he’s [got] no social skills . . . so he doesn’t
engage with people so he’s not, in my opinion, equipped for
life. (P1)
Social isolation was also identified as a vulnerability
factor but was not necessarily seen as an adjunct to mental
health problems:
Individuals tend to have characteristics linked to that isolation,
don’t have big networks, don’t have big association networks,
can access the Internet, live quite isolated lives, aren’t well
known, don’t have a lot of friends. (P5)
On the whole, participants’ comments revealed a pater-
nalistic attitude towards those regarded by dint of poor
mental health as vulnerable to radicalisation. Participants
highlighted a number of social or environmental factors
that they thought influenced vulnerability to radicalisation.
Reference was not made to an evidence base; instead, as
elsewhere, a folk-psychology approach (Hutto, 2009) was
adopted to explain influences on lone actors.
Participants characterised education as having bi-
directional influence: it could function as a protective fac-
tor or as a driver of vulnerability.
Education, depending on what that level of education is . . .
it’s not about attainment, it’s about the level of education
you’ve received, your ability to be educated, your ability to
access education. (P2)
I think living in deprived areas, low educational aspiration
or attainment, or where you get people that have done quite
well at school but can’t get university places or can’t get,
having been to university, can’t get into the better quality
employment opportunities . . . you see a lot of people who
we’ve encountered who have gone through school, done quite
well, been to university, got a decent degree but still stacking
shelves at Tesco. (P5)
It can work on two levels: people who’ve not had access to
education are in a position where you can’t rationalise
things . . . or if you’re super educated you might over think
things and get to a point where you’ll work yourself into a
position where you see issues round every corner, you see con-
spiracy . . . you see things that may or may not be there. (P2)
Pathways to or processes of radicalisation were not
explicated beyond the level of generalised influences on
vulnerability. Again, ideas were refracted through a police
lens with participants reaching for a propensity to general-
ised criminality as explanation. This perhaps points to the
absence of evidence-based knowledge on counter-
terrorism.
If that environment involves criminality then obviously you’re
more likely to move into a criminal field. (P2)
If that environment isn’t right, then individuals can be radi-
calised and influenced. (P3)
The people we see in our line of work are no less vulnerable
to drugs gangs; no less vulnerable to sexual exploitation; no
less vulnerable to being abused . . . it’s just that . . . people
that come along want them to do other things. (P1)
It should be noted that one participant did explicitly
mention the evidence base with reference to case studies.
Again, from convicted terrorist case studies, you look at it and
it’s a massive factor all the time. They’ve been subjected to
hate crime and discrimination and it’s not been dealt with
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appropriately by whoever the authorities are . . . you abso-
lutely are in a place where you will listen to people who tell
you: you need to do something to hit back. (P2)
Results obviously support the general idea of a pathway.
However, a pathway would be a reliable-enough character-
isation of any series of behaviours over time, and partici-
pants’ ideas did not correspond to any specific model. Where
discussion did move beyond generalised (e.g. environmen-
tal) influences, participants’ ideas were implicitly based on a
diathesis–stress model (Goforth, Pham and Carlson, 2011),
whereby life events functioned as insurmountable challenges
and thus became turning points. Specifically, an individual’s
vulnerability to acceptance of a radical ideal and consider-
ation of violence was not necessarily constant. Critical life
events may reduce resilience, thus rendering the individual
more vulnerable to radicalisation:
I also think there’s a timing element to it; sometimes there
might be an issue and it might pass people by. And other times,
because there’s a lot of other things going on in their life, that
issue that may have passed them by a year before, at that point
in their life becomes the most important thing. Certainly if
they’ve got low self-esteem and they need something to gal-
vanise themselves then they can fixate on that thing. (P1)
I went through a divorce and your whole perception
changes and I think if at that time . . . you are more
vulnerable . . . You might have had the same things happen
to you in the previous twenty years but if something hits you at
that point when you’re down, I can see where you might
change . . . you often need something else to focus on. I can
see that being the hook really. (P1)
If you have suffered a loss or bereavement . . . a loss usu-
ally means a breakup in the family unit . . . something that
actually has had a massive impact on how you exist . . . but
superficially bereavement; you are very, very vulnerable to
extremism in that situation. (P2)
As the extracts show, participants made sense of the
impact of environmental stressors experienced by lone
actors by reference to folk psychology (Hutto, 2009) and
also through analogy to their own adverse life experiences.
Despite the social pressures exerted by the presence of
external voices, some ascribed more agency and ultimate
responsibility to the potential lone actor:
I’m not so sure that there isn’t always some sort of outside
influence but I think it’s fair to say . . . the influence is some-
thing they seek out via the Internet or whatever . . . They find
and they come to their own conclusions in relation to what
they’ve researched and done and then they decide what they
want to do about it. (P2)
In conclusion, participants strived to explain vulnerabil-
ity by making various causal attributions. Discussions clus-
tered around folk-psychological explanations and an
implicit diathesis–stress model was used (Goforth et al.,
2011). Overall, very little reference was made to evidence-
based research.
Motivation
A key part of examining lone-actor radicalisation is
attempting to identify what motivates a potential lone actor
initially to seek out and then identify with a radical ideol-
ogy. Participants saw the idea of individuals possessing a
grievance as the single overriding motivational character-
istic regardless of whether the grievance was real, per-
ceived or what the grievance itself was. This point of
view was supported by all participants with examples cited.
It’s more about grievance, whether that’s real or per-
ceived. (P1)
Whether it’s right or wrong, that doesn’t matter. (P2)
Grievances are [the motivation], and we live in a country
where at the moment Muslims are arguably treated differently
than others, whether it’s the criminal justice system. (P3)
They’ve got a grievance which has kicked in. Whether it’s
the concept of a white Europe and they’re trying to stick up for
it . . . something kicks them off. (P4)
Notwithstanding the dominance of the concept of grie-
vance, other motivational factors were proffered such as
perceived personal rewards for participation:
You’ve got somebody that’s got nothing and no hope . . . and
actually they were going to do what they were doing anyway
but be told that they’re going to score loads of points, get
themselves very popular, 70 virgins, whatever . . . I think that
can be quite a strong message. (P1)
Participants also expressed the idea that motivation
could be due to personal gratification rather than altruistic
participation to further ideological goals. Reference was
made to a case in which the individual enjoyed a temporary
escape from his circumstances:
Possibly one of the most mundane existences [due to] a very,
very strict family . . . He will tell you, when he walked
towards the library, he was getting butterflies in his stomach
because it was exciting. (P1)
When asked to suggest reasons for an individual choos-
ing to commit a terrorist attack independently of any
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organisational structure, participants provided three main
reasons: the grievance was very personal to the individual,
they had been encouraged to do so by an external party, and
they did not possess the means/opportunity to join an
organisation.
The very easy way to get those people together is to tell them
that actually you’re special, you’re part of an elite . . . you’re
specially chosen. (P1)
[Rational prospectors have] a skill in saying ‘My job is to
teach you and make sure you fulfil your duty as a martyr’. (P1)
Defend the Umma, their Muslim brothers . . . don’t see it as a
personal responsibility in the sense it’s something they’ve chosen
to do, they see it as an obligation as part of their faith. (P2)
We know through some of the reporting that ISIS
approaches, they’ve been posting information on the Internet,
YouTube, that is encouraging people . . . if they can’t travel
and fight at the frontline, then there’s a fight here. (P5)
It’s huge, probably one of the key influences of most, if not
all of the people we’ve engaged with . . . over a three-year
period we have engaged with 2 to 300 young people, the
common denominator was the access and use of Internet. (P5)
Findings on motivation supported earlier literature on
social movement theory with all participants making men-
tion of external (rational prospectors’) appeals to vulnera-
ble individuals and the role of the Internet as a social force
despite the absence of formal affiliations. Again, there was
support for Spaiij’s (2012) earlier work on individual grie-
vance as a motivator. In the current study, there was less
support for the detailed cognitive mechanisms contained in
conversion theory. It might simply not account for the indi-
viduals whom participants had encountered. Alternatively,
practitioners may be unfamiliar with the evidence base.
They did nonetheless ‘look inside’ and speculate on lone
actors’ motivations which did not relate to grievance:
You’ve got power. I think that’s what it is. You’ve got power
to do something, you can make a difference. We’d all like to
make a difference in the world. (P4)
The thing about politics: it takes forever, it’s boring, lot of hassle
and I think with young men in particular, they like guns, like
fighting, it’s very exciting, so there’s that element to it as well. (P4)
Discussion
Five Prevent practitioners in this qualitative study saw radi-
calisation among lone actors as a process, although the
participants did not map an exact procedure. The support
of a radicalisation pathway without a singular model may
seem to strengthen Spaaij’s (2012) depiction of radicalisa-
tion as a unique trajectory of idiosyncratic chemistry
between vulnerability factors. However, participants did
not relate unique, idiosyncratic cases. Rather, they
described mental health problems and grievances as classi-
fiably common features. Generalised criminality or other
common-sense or folk-psychological explanations (Hutto,
2009) were proffered (e.g. social deprivation, poor educa-
tion, absence of nurturing).
Notwithstanding the lack of support for mapped radica-
lisation pathways, there was some correspondence between
aspects of current themes and named stages of radicalisa-
tion models in the earlier literature, but it requires cherry-
picking to do so. This may point to the Barnum effect,
which casts doubt on the utility of radicalisation models
with discrete stages. It would be too strong to conclude that
such models are artefactual. An alternative conclusion may
be more safely drawn: Prevent practitioners seem unaware
of the evidence base, given that they made little to no
reference to the literature when explaining motivations and
mechanisms of radicalisation.
Current findings showed less support for conversion
theory, although this does not necessarily militate against
the theory’s validity given participants were not psycholo-
gists (it may, however, point to their unfamiliarity with
extant research). Some participants implicitly applied social
movement theories to explain the radicalisation of lone
actors. The Prevent practitioners drew on the concept of a
rational prospector with the potential to manipulate individ-
uals’ sentiments, and the importance of a community as a
means of testing and reinforcing thought processes. The
social movement paradigm was also supported through prac-
titioners’ descriptions of the role of the Internet. Participants
described the Internet as a suitable platform from which to
disseminate messages, where rational prospectors could per-
suade an individual towards taking personal responsibility
for furthering ideological goals.
Factors that increase an individual’s vulnerability to
radical discourse received extensive support from Prevent
practitioners. Mental health issues appeared to be a com-
mon feature characterising the lone actors that participants
come into contact with on a regular basis. This ostensibly
contradicts earlier research that terrorists are not charac-
terised by mental illness and that so-called normal psychol-
ogy is an almost universal trait (Bakker and de Graaf,
2011), but it is countered by studies that focus on lone
actors (Corner and Gill, 2015; Hewitt, 2003). However, it
was not clear from current data what expertise informed
participants’ conclusions: it is a commonplace that beha-
viour which cannot be understood becomes categorised as
irrational, with a small step from there to imputing mental
health problems.
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This study’s participants tended to perceive lone wolves
as individuals with mental health problems. What is not
clear from this small study is whether those perceptions
have any reliable basis. As mentioned earlier, the literature
suggests a higher prevalence of mental health problems
among lone wolves than among other terrorists (Hewitt,
2003; Spaiij, 2010, 2012). Future research might usefully
explore more fully practitioners’ awareness of research in
this specific area. Likewise, further work is needed on the
consequences of practitioners’ perceptions of lone wolves
as having mental health problems; specifically, further
exploration is warranted into the impact these perceptions
of mental illness might have on the delivery of Prevent and
how widespread the perceptions are. The views of this
small sample may well be insufficient to influence organi-
sational culture, but it is possible that these views are actu-
ally already representative of organisational norms with a
concomitant impact on practice. Generally, then, mental
health is potentially a rich seam to explore with regard to
its impact on counter-terrorism practice and delivery of
Prevent. Given the more recent literature showing higher
rates of mental illness among lone actors, it could foresee-
ably make efforts at disengagement more challenging
(Springer, 2009).
It was evident from the references to generalised crim-
inality that practitioner perceptions were refracted through
a policing lens (but see Gill, Horgan and Deckert, 2014, on
terrorism and generalised criminality). Nonetheless, the
vulnerabilities and motivational factors highlighted consti-
tute valuable future research avenues. For example, Eby
(2012) found education to be a factor influencing individ-
ual vulnerability (albeit as an unreliable indicator of radi-
calisation potential). This study mirrored this conclusion as
participants described how quality of education may indir-
ectly affect radicalisation potential. However, this study
has yielded a somewhat more original interpretation in that
high educational achievement was seen to contribute to
grievances stemming from perceived injustice.
More generally, practitioners expressed affinity for the
idea of grievance being the key motivator, or push factor, of
seeking redress by violent means; this is a well-understood
concept in contemporary radicalisation research and may
provide the cognitive opening or crisis in Wiktorowicz’s
(2005) model and conversion theory respectively (Borum,
2011a). Grievance was not the only motivation perceived in
individuals who become lone actors. More narcissistic
incentives such as sensation seeking, risky behaviour or
attaining popularity or notoriety were also proffered.
Although participants supported the notion of lone actors
motivated by excitement potential, they did not suggest its
significance in relation to achieving ideological goals.
Bates (2012), however, postulated that engaging in risky
behaviour can be as important as the affiliated ideology.
Conclusion
In conclusion, this study was able to identify key practi-
tioner themes about lone actors allowing comparison with
research outcomes of current literature. The study found
that existing models of radicalisation were not validated
specifically by Prevent practitioners, but some individual
features were supported. Prevent practitioners saw radica-
lised individuals as vulnerable to external influences. Influ-
ences were seen as proximal and distal, the former
including mental illness, deprivation or generalised crim-
inality, the latter including rational prospectors via the
Internet: findings that show some support for social move-
ment theory. Indeed, participants saw online platforms as
important in the radicalisation of lone actors, supporting
earlier research (Weimann, 2012). Heath-Kelly (2013)
reported a dearth of empirical counter-terrorism studies.
This was also noted by King and Taylor (2011) who also
argued that radicalisation models were developed without
reference to earlier models. This might account for the lack
of correspondence between discrete stages and findings in
this study about practitioners’ views of lone actors. It may
also highlight the difficulty in obtaining ecologically valid
data (Sageman, 2014).
Overall conclusions that can be drawn are that lone
actors are viewed as proceeding down a radicalisation path-
way due to the need/desire to address grievances or satisfy
a deficiency based on vulnerability factors. Prevent practi-
tioners did not make explicit reference to any evidence
base, but drew on folk-psychological explanations (Hutto,
2009) to account for lone-actor radicalisation and violent
behaviours.
Participants reached, then, for folk-psychological expla-
nations to understand the phenomenon of lone-wolf terror-
ism for lack of research knowledge. It may be unsurprising
that practitioners lack an in-depth understanding of aca-
demic literature, but this does not excuse the absence of
evidence-based practice. There is a normative dimension to
the problem: academia ought not to be a separate parallel
stream from praxis and neither party can afford to be com-
placent. Knowledge exchange is the responsibility of aca-
demics and practitioners alike. Practitioners charged with
delivering effective intervention programmes aimed at de-
radicalising individuals regarded as vulnerable ought to
have a solid grounding in main theories and empirical find-
ings on the subject. It is the responsibility of academics to
ensure that research has utility beyond journal publication.
Academic peers ought to be the start not the end point of
dissemination of research findings.
In the U.K., the establishment of the College of Policing
and commissioned partnerships with research councils are
welcome trends in developing evidence-based counter-
terrorism practice. Partnerships can also be built informally
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from the ground up and direct approaches locally can
encourage early adopters of ideas which ultimately bear
fruit at national level. There are different channels avail-
able for dissemination. Conferences as forums for knowl-
edge exchange are as familiar a practice for practitioner
agencies as they are for academics. Practitioners responsi-
ble for education are keen to embrace academic input into
practitioner training. Academics being proactive in offering
to inform practitioners about the relevance of their research
to applied problems would be a welcome step in developing
evidence-based practice. For example, they would help to
reduce the folk-psychological explanations of lone wolves
revealed by this study.
Better knowledge exchange could help develop
evidence-based policy. Given the influence of policy as a
communicator of the status quo (Andras and Charlton,
2005) and of organisational products generally in
maintaining organisational identity (Eyre, 2014), policy
development is an obvious means of developing counter-
terrorism practice and influencing organisational culture
positively. Policies could incorporate recommendations
that practice and continuing professional development
must take account of the evidence base. Similarly, by citing
them as poor practice, policy can invoke prohibitions on
folk-psychological explanations (Hutto, 2009) or inferring
mental health problems in the absence of assessment. This
study has identified a potential training need in that the
boundaries of roles and responsibilities need to be better
understood; likewise, developing awareness of which key
professionals hold appropriate responsibility might help
reduce such attributions being made.
Better understanding of the phenomenon of lone-wolf
terrorism is a requisite foundation if practitioners are to
dissuade potential lone wolves from acts of violence and
steer them towards alternative non-violent avenues that
would appeal or engage the types of individual in this
group. The preceding step is, of course, to displace the
stagnation in terrorism research identified by Sageman
(2014). It requires academics to embrace opportunities for
access to data when and where they appear, which in turn,
requires rejection of methodolotry. Acceptance of ‘good-
enough’ methods with a keen eye on limitations might
begin to build a better empirical picture. It would at least
help to define the problem space (Barton, Corteen, Scott
and Whyte, 2007) more accurately, which cannot be done if
academics prize methodological detail too highly. When
privileging methodological detail comes at the expense of
paralysing empirical work altogether, the cost is too high
and the methodological debate is in any case redundant
(Eyre, 2014; Frost and Nolas, 2011).
More fundamentally, displacing the stagnation would be
predicated on the forging of academic–practitioner partner-
ships based on trust: trust that data (from larger samples
than the present one) can be safely released to academics
with the methodological skills to conduct analyses; recipro-
cally, trust that results will find their way back to the practi-
tioner community which needs them to inform and develop
practice.
Given the difficulty in obtaining ecologically valid data,
this study makes a contribution: it provides a rare insight
into the perceptions and experiences of Prevent officers and
a useful springboard for further exploration of radicalisa-
tion of and violent acts by lone actors. The ostensible dis-
connect between the academic literature and practitioner
perceptions serves as a call to academics to engage more
in applied research, to practitioners to facilitate access, to
develop knowledge exchange and ensure practice becomes
evidence based.
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